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INTRODUCTION 
Nigeria is a multi-cultural society with over 250 ethnic groups as 
well as three major religious groups namely Christianity, Islam and Afri­
can Traditional Religion (ATR) . With an estimated population of about 
200 million people, "the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba and the Igbo account 
for almost half of Nigeria' s population, and many smaller groups tend to 
cluster around these three, creating a tri-polar ethnic structure around 
which competition strategies intensify" (CRISE Working Paper 44, 
March 2007) .  The Human Rights Watch report also observes that, "the 
country is divided along religious lines, with the boundaries between 
Muslim and Christian often overlapping with some of the most important 
ethnic and cultural divides" (Human Rights Watch, 2006). 
The cultural diversity of the Nigerian state naturally creates a plat­
form for competitive struggles between and among the existing interest 
groups. For instance, since the return to democratic governance on May 
29, 1 999, the country has witnessed very violent and turbulent ethnic and 
religiously induced conflicts, some of which have seriously shaken its 
political, economic and social foundations to the extent that the country ' s  
'hard earned ' Fourth Republic has been o n  the brink of collapse. This 
ominous trajectory currently facing the Nigerian state has made Profes­
sor Isaac Olawale Albert argue that: 
Since Nigeria transited from military dictatorship to 
multi-party democracy on 29 May, 1 999. The country 
has been bedeviled by various forms of violent social 
conflicts. Thousands of people lost their lives, were 
maimed or displaced from their communities as a result 
of these problems. While some of the conflicts had their 
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roots in the past historical circumstances of the con­
cerned communities, some others were "manufactured" 
by the elites, seeking to stretch the liberty inherent in the 
new democratic process in Nigeria to a breaking, if not 
absurd point (Albert, 200 1 ) . 
The reality of this situation is that the Nigerian elites often find it very 
convenient to employ ethnicity and religion as tools in order to manipu­
late Nigerians in their power play game, owing to the hypnotic and ma­
nipulative power of ethnicity and religion on Nigerians. As Momodu 
rightly observes :  
Religious and ethnic manipulations hold sway between 
and among ethnic groups with large number of illiterate 
populations and high incidence of poverty. This situation 
makes it possible for ethnic or religious entrepreneurs to 
assume the role of 'messiahs ' or 'freedom fighters ' for 
their ethnic or religious groups .  In actual fact, the goals 
and interests that they seek to achieve are disguised as 
those of their ethnic or religious groups, which they 
claim to represent. Whenever these goals and interests 
appear to be threatened, they fan the embers of ethnic or 
religious hatred and conflict between their own ethnic or 
religious groups against the ethnic or religious group 
they perceive to be threatening their goals, using them as 
'ethnic or religious sacrificial lambs ' for the sole pur­
pose of achieving their own selfish ends (Momodu, 
20 l4-emphasis added) . 
Ethnicity and religion play a very important role both in the private and 
public lives of Nigerians and this is affirmed by an authoritative survey 
carried out in 2000 on Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria, 
which notes that ethnicity "is demonstrably the most conspicuous group 
identity in Nigeria" (Lewis and Bratton 2000). Thus, the survey found 
out that almost one-half (48 .2%) of Nigerians chose to label themselves 
with an ethnic (including linguistic and local-regional) identity, com­
pared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for class identities, and 
2 1 .0 percent who chose a religious identity (Lewis and Bratton 2000) . 
The study specifically indicated that "Nigerians tend to cluster more 
readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of 
the workplace" (Lewis and Bratton 2000). 
The findings of the above scholars point to the fact that most Nigeri­
ans, about two-thirds of the country' s  population, show more loyalty to 
their ethnic and religious constituencies .  This places both ethnicity and 
religion in a serious competition for the soul of the Nigerian state, just as 
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God and the devil are competing for the soul of humanity . This danger­
ous competition has often bred violent ethno-religious conflicts in the 
country. Salawu (201 0) observed that "about 40% of ethno- religious 
conflicts are credited to the fourth Republic of Nigeria, while observers 
have equally described the situation as a permanent feature of the Nigeria 
state," ethno-religious cohflicts tend to always stretch the bounds of 
unity to a potential snapping point (Jega, 2002) .  
Inter-group relations in Nigeria are largely determined by ethnic, 
religious, economic and cultural factors thus creating fault-lines in most 
Nigerian communities .  In particular, inter-group relations between and 
among ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria are characterized fre­
quently by mutual suspicion and hatred to the extent that at the slightest 
provocation conflict is inevitable between communities ;  in most cases 
assuming very violent dimensions .  This is the reason for instance why 
Okwueze ( 1 995) rightly observed that, "Nigeria is one of the countries 
where religion and ethnic conflicts have wrecked much havoc on the 
advancement, unity and prosperity of her citizens and the development of 
the nation as a whole." 
Nigeria is also one of the African countries most severely affected 
by violence. It is ranked 148 out of 1 62 countries worldwide in the 
Global Peace Index (Vision for Humanity, Global Peace Index, 20 1 3) .  It 
has the third largest number of political violence events in Armed Con­
flict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED),  and it is ranked 1 6th in the 
Fund for Peace Failed States Index 20 1 3  (Fund for Peace, 20 1 3) .  A 20 1 2  
survey of Nigerians on crime and victimization by the CLEEN Founda­
tion found that, on average, 5% of respondents had personally been vic­
tims of armed violence (CLEEN Foundation, 20 1 2) .  
There are many ethno-religious conflicts that have occurred in Ni­
geria. For instance, Mohammed (2005) contends that before the present 
democratic dispensation in Nigeria, there were ethno-religious conflicts 
that claimed so many lives and property. Some examples of such crises 
include: the Maitatsine religious disturbances that ravaged parts of Kano, 
Bauchi, and Maiduguri in the early 1 980s, which also spilled over to 
Jimeta-Yola 1 984; the Zango Kataf crises in Kaduna State 1 992; and the 
Kafanchan College of Education Muslim-Christian riots and Kaduna Pol­
ytechnic Muslim-Christian skirmishes 1 98 1  and 1 982. There are also 
other incidents of ethno-religious conflicts including: the Bulum kutu 
Christian-Muslim riots 1 982;  Usman Danfodio University Sokoto 1 982;  
and the Muslim-Christian clash during a Christian procession at Easter in 
Ilorin, Kwara State 1 986. Other examples are the ethno -religious con­
flict of July 1 8 , 1 999 between the Oodua people congress and Hausa 
traders at Shagamu in Ogun State ; the February ethno-religious crisis 
between Zagon and Kataf communities in Kaduna State between 1 999-
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200 1 ;  and the protracted ethno- religious conflict in Jos, plateau State in 
200 1 ,  2002, 2008,  20 1 0  and 201 1 .  And of course, the protracted ethno­
religious conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State 
which started from 2000 to date, which is the central focus of this paper. 
The following thematic areas form the basis for discussion in this paper: 
• Literature review, conceptual clarifications and theoretical 
framework, 
• Origin and causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari Local 
Government Area of Taraba State, 
• Costs of ethno-religious conflicts on inter-group relations in 
Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State, 
• Suggested solutions to the management of ethno-religious con­
flicts on inter-group relations in Wukari Local Government Area 
of Taraba State, and 
• Conclusion. 




Religion, according to Adeniyi ( 1 993) ,  refers to a body of truths ,  
laws and rites by which man is subordinated to  the transcendent being. 
This implies that religion deals with norms and rules that emanated from 
God and which must be followed by the believers . Ejizu ( 1 993) provides 
another definition of religion. According to him, religion is man ' s intui­
tion of the sacred and ultimate reality and his expression of that aware­
ness in concrete life. In essence, religion can be defined as the belief 
system held by a group of people towards a supreme being which they 
revere and believe can guarantee their security and welfare and their ex­
istence here on earth and in the hereafter. 
ETHNIC GROUP 
The term "ethnic" is derived from a Greek adjective ethnikos, mean­
ing "national, foreign, gentile ." The adjective is derived from the noun 
ethnos, "people, nation, foreign people," that in the plural phrase ta ethn 
meaning "foreign nations" (The American Heritage Dictionary of the En­
glish Language, Fourth Edition, 2000) . However, the task of defining 
ethnic group is somewhat difficult. Hence, many scholars believe that 
definitions of what constitutes an ethnic group or an ethnic minority are 
subject to much discussion (see Coleman and Salt, 1 996; Bulmer, 1 996; 
Ballard, 1 996; Solomos and Black, 1 996). 
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The variations in the definitions of ethnic group and the lack of 
agreement among scholars on what should constitute the meaning of an 
ethnic group is responsible for the multiplicity of definitions on the con­
cept by various scholars in ethnic studies ,  ethnic conflict, sociology, po­
lit ical  science and related disc ipl ine s .  However ,  the common 
denominators in the many descriptions that have been given to ethnic 
group are : people residing within the same geographical territory, people 
who share the same historical memories, common origins, common iden­
tity, language, culture, and aspirations. What really is an ethnic group? 
Modood; Berthoud; Lakey; Nazroo; Smith; Virdee and Beishon ( 1 997) 
define an ethnic group as a community whose heritage offers important 
characteristics in common between its members and which makes them 
distinct from other communities .  There is a boundary, which separates 
'us'  from 'them' , and the distinction would probably be recognized on 
both sides of that boundary. Quaker-Dokubo (2001 )  also perceives ethnic 
group as pertaining to organized activities by persons linked by a con­
sciousness of a special identity, who jointly seek to maximize their cor­
porate political, economic and social interest. Willigenburg ( 1 995) refers 
to ethnic group as "cultural nations which are bound together in the first 
place by a common culture and which lack the internationally recognised 
organization of a sovereign state" . 
ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT 
Ethno-religious conflict refers to a situation in which members of an 
ethnic group practicing the same religion engage in mutually opposing 
coercive interactions with members of another ethnic group practicing 
the same but different religion from the former group. Ethno-religious 
conflict is often characterised by a mixture of both ethnic and religious 
agitations. It is also a situation in which at least the interests or goals of 
members of an ethnic group who belong to the same religious group are 
in opposition to the interests or goals of another ethnic group practicing 
the same religion but different from the former group is exclusively de­
fined in ethnic and religious terms. Ethnicity and religion are tools for 
identity construction by the elites who draw on the mesmerizing and ma­
nipulative tendencies of both ethnicity and religion in competitive situa­
tions .  The combination of ethnicity and religion for identity construction 
produces a strong platform for identity mobilization. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE THEORY 
The study also adopted the theory of Territorial Imperative devel­
oped by Robert Ardrey in 1 967, in which he traced the animal origin of 
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property, nations and territoriality. A territory is defined as an area of 
space which an animal or group of animals defend as an exclusive pre­
serve. It is within such territory that the basic needs and interests of such 
animals are gratified. These needs include : security of space and food, 
identity, prestige, etc . They therefore defend such an area at all costs and 
strive to keep it out those who undermine their interests and needs.  Fol­
lowing the above postulation, all animals ,  including man, have the natu­
ral tendency or instinct to be territorial and possessive, especially when 
their territories and possessions are threatened. In order to ward-off this 
threat, they will employ any means available to them to defend their 
territories and possessions.  This is the reason why Ardrey ( 1 967) opined 
that "if we defend the title to our land or the sovereignty of our country, 
we do it for reasons no different, no less innate, no less ineradicable, than 
do lower animals ." 
In the same manner, Sherif and Sherif ( 1969) support this view by 
arguing that territorial aggression in animals is based on the relatively 
simple chemical, tactile and visual discriminations involved in detecting 
unfamiliar 'opponents ' while for humans the concept of ' territory' de­
pends on complex cultural symbolizations of property or 'homeland' . 
People, they pointed out, are quite capable of territorial loyalty without 
actually living in the territory itself. Therefore, conflict may ensue in an 
attempt by individuals, groups, or countries to defend their territories, 
land, traditions, culture, and property they so value. For instance, Tor­
Tiv, the paramount ruler of the Tiv people observes that "in many tradi­
tions, land matters are closely tied to the custom of the people ; hence it 
could be very volatile" (Torkula, 2002).  
This ,  in part, explains the reasons why ethnic groups fight over land 
and territory. Indeed, scholars have argued that territorially concentrated 
groups in divided societies are more likely to demand self-determination 
(Saideman and Ayres, 2000 and Toft 2003 ; Toft and Saideman 20 1 0) and 
to be engaged in violent conflict in its pursuit (Fearon and Laitin 1 999; 
Weidmann, Rod, Cederman 20 1 0) .  This also explains the situation of the 
protracted ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari between the Jukun Chris­
tians allied with the Jukun traditionalists versus the Jukun Muslims sup­
ported by Hausa Muslims . The latter feels threatened by the resolve of 
the former to chase them out of their ancestral land and also deprive 
them of participating in both the political affairs of Wukari Local Gov­
ernment and in the Traditional Council of Wukari. As a result, the two 
groups have been engulfed in a fierce battle for the contest over who 
owns Wukari land and who is qualified to enjoy the rights and benefits of 
being indigenes of Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State. The 
conflict between the two groups in Wukari, Taraba State is a classic ex­
ample of a struggle over territory and ethnic dominance. 
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ORIGIN AND CAUSES OF VIOLENT ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN 
WUKART LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA OF 
TARABA STATE, NIGERIA 
Inter-group relations among communities in Nigeria is rooted in the 
colonial history of the Nigerian state . However, inter-group relations in 
Nigeria predate the pre-colonial era and as a matter of fact, inter-group 
relations among Nigeria' s pre-colonial societies could be said to be both 
harmonious and conflictive and span diverse areas such as : cultural ex­
changes, commerce, politics,  and social spheres .  But one fascinating as­
pect of inter-group relations in the Nigerian pre-colonial societies was 
that ethnic migrants were in many places integrated and assimilated into 
their host communities, even inter-marrying. Buttressing this argument, 
Olaniyi (200 1 )  cites the case of Yoruba Ayagi quarters in Kano who after 
a century of settlement had been assimilated into Hausa culture. Usman 
( 1 98 1 )  describes a similar assimilation process in respect to diverse 
groups that migrated into Katsina and became "absorbed into the house­
holds patronages through marriages and cohabitation." 
The colonial political economy further increased the migration of 
Hausa people into Y oruba land. This was due to the emergence of the 
colonial capitalist economy which introduced taxes and opened up roads 
and railways linking all the major cities of Nigeria. Hopkins ( 1 973) be­
lieves that such factors encouraged and facilitated the increase in migra­
tion of Nigerians generally. Furthermore, Swindell ( 1 984) observes that 
"as the twentieth century developed, labour migration clearly took on 
new dimension and, from what can be inferred, there was a rapid in­
crease in the volume of migration to meet new levels of taxation and 
demands for labour in the towns and commercial crop zones." Conse­
quently, this trend has heightened competition for the available scarce 
resources between hosts and settlers across major towns in Nigeria until 
today . This is also the case with Wukari Local Government Area of 
Taraba State, which is an amalgam of different ethnic and religious 
populations and has consequently witnessed many violent ethnic and re­
ligiously induced conflicts. 
Recently, Wukari has been experiencing a protracted ethno-relig­
ious conflict and the main cause of the conflict has been the struggle for 
the control of Wukari land and, by extension, competition for the eco­
nomic and political resources in the area between the Jukun Christians 
allied with the Jukun traditionalists and the Jukun Muslims supported by 
Hausa Muslims in the area. Both parties hold tenaciously to their dispa­
rate narratives which they often express .  On one hand, the Jukun Chris­
tians in alliance with the Jukun traditionalists accuse the Jukun Muslims 
supported by Hausa Muslims of wanting to deliberately and systemati­
cally violate the Jukun traditional culture by planning to politically con-
1 1 2 ETHNIC STUDIES REVIEW [Vol . 36 : 1 05 
trol Wukari. The Jukun Christians, who consider themselves not only the 
owners of Wukari land but also the custodians of the Jukun traditional 
culture, are prepared to spill their last blood to defend it from the en­
croachment of the Muslim Jukun supported by the Rausa Muslim settlers 
on Wukari land. 
On the other hand, the Jukun Muslims supported by Rausa Muslims 
accuse the Jukun Christians and the Jukun traditionalists of excluding 
them from the political control of Wukari Local Government Area as 
well as from the traditional Council. These are the real issues in the con­
flict and these issues have encouraged the politicization of both ethnic 
and religious identities in Wukari area. This is so because scholars have 
argued that ethnic and religious conflicts are rooted in the politicization 
of ethnic and religious identities and the competition and conflict for 
political power by the ethnic and religious communities respectively 
(Anarfi, 2004; Conversi, 1 999). More specifically, Takaya ( 1 992: 1 1 2) 
identified centrifugal factors that gave rise to the politicization of ethnic 
and religious identities in Nigeria, which include: 
(i) the existence of two or more ethnic and religious groups with nu­
merical strengths that can significantly affect the outcome and di­
rection of a democratic political process ;  
(ii) the instrumentalization of  ethnicity and religion as  a legitimizing 
tool of hegemony in instances when the interests of the political 
class are under threat; 
(iii) when there is an ascendant radical thinking within a politically sig­
nificant ethnic or religious group capable of upstaging hegemony; 
(iv) when the society is characterized by political, social or economic 
hardships that can cause alliances along ethnic and religious fault­
lines .  
The persistent conflicts between Jukun Christians/Jukun traditionalists 
versus the Jukun Muslims supported by Rausa Muslims have led to loss 
of many lives and the destruction of much property and have distorted 
inter-group relations in the Wukari community . The mixture of ethnicity 
and religion have taken the situation between the warring groups to 
unimaginable and deadly heights such that brothers and sisters who have 
the same ancestral linkage and have co-existed in harmony for centuries 
have suddenly turned on one another with murderous fervor, a situation 
re-enforced by bitter and dangerous politics .  
The vulnerability of the Wukari community to violent conflicts can 
be attributed mainly to factors such as: the contest for indigeneship of 
Wukari LGA; competition for political, social and economic space; the 
problem of youth unemployment; and arms proliferation in the area. It is 
in the light of these factors that Mitchell (2000) asserts that conflicts 
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involving settlers and natives usually revolve around the question of 
land, and in most cases around the quest by settlers to dispossess the 
natives of their land through what he called migratory overcrowding. 
Mitchell ' s  assertion can be said to be true about the Wukari community 
which is an area that is agriculturally rich and has often resulted in vio­
lent competition for resources between the Jukun, who consider them­
selves as the natives of Wukari, against the other ethnic groups such as 
Tiv, Fulanis and Hausa communities in Wukari. 
The Jukun Christians/Jukun traditionalists believe that the Hausal 
Fulani settlers are collaborating with the Jukun Muslims and that their 
hidden agenda is to Islamize and take over Jukun land. This suspicion of 
the Jukun Christians and Jukun traditionalists is also the same one that is 
held by most host communities where the HausaIFulani groups are set­
tled. This accounts for why the HausalFulani settlers are much resented, 
which along with their domineering tendencies ,  makes the host commu­
nities discriminate against them. Best (2006) has rightly observed that 
"the struggle of ethnic minorities ,  framed by their experience of domina­
tion, tends to be targeted primarily against the HausaIFulani, and indi­
rectly against the Nigerian State". The mobilization of religious and 
ethnic sentiments and solidarity towards gaining control over Wukari 
land has been fueling violent conflicts between the Jukun Christians in 
alliance with the Jukun traditionalists against the Jukun Muslims also in 
alliance with the Hausa settlers in Wukari. 
Another major cause of the violent ethno-religious conflicts in 
Wukari is the availability of small and big arms in the area. For instance, 
Wukari has witnessed so many violent conflicts such as the protracted 
violent conflicts between the Jukun and Tiv which, according to 
Momodu (201 4) ,  is :  
One of the most violent and recurring ethnic conflicts 
that have occurred in Nigeria and the periodic clashes 
between the two groups span from the 1 860s to 1 899, 
1 904, 1 950s, 1 964, 1 976, 1 987;  and from 1 990- 1 993 and 
200 1 -2002, it climaxed into violent warfare. The human, 
economic, political, social and psychological costs asso­
ciated with these perennial conflicts are colossal and 
some of these costs are still very visible in Wukari 
(Momodu, 201 4) .  
Wukari has also witnessed pockets of  skirmishes between the Tiv and 
Fulani, Jukun and Fulani as well the current persistent ethno-religious 
conflicts in the area. These several crises have deeply entrenched the 
culture of violence in inter-group relations in the area. Momodu (20 1 4) 
established that, "the free usage of arms especially by the Tiv and Jukun 
militias to kill and maim indicates the magnitude of proliferation of arms 
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in Wukari and its environs and it also suggests the vulnerability of 
Wukari to violent conflicts ."  This situation therefore underscores the 
"privatisation of violence that challenges the monopoly of violence as a 
defining feature of the state" (Debiel, 2002). The proliferation of arms in 
Wukari has made the area unstable and unsecured. 
Clearly, the Wukari community is Balkanized along ethnic and re­
ligious fault lines thus resulting in a situation where the Jukun Christians 
lack confidence or trust in their fellow Jukun Muslims or HausalFulani 
settlers in Wukari community. As a result, there currently exists a psy­
chological and physical fault line between the Jukun Christians and 
Jukun Traditionalists on one hand and on the other hand the Jukun Mus­
lims and HausalFulani. This situation has often given the impetus for 
violent conflicts . This tendency if not checked will continue to create 
instability in the area, which is the way in which it is currently playing 
out. 
IMPACT OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN 
WUKARI LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF TARABA STATE 
The following table is the time line of violent conflicts in Wukari 
Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria between 2000 up till 
date. 
TIME LINE OF VIOLENT ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN WUKARI 
L.G.A. FROM 2000 - 20 14  
Sino: Triggers Period Casualties 
1 .  The destruction of a mosque under Early 2000 1 8  people were 
construction at the premises of FRSC killed while 
Office Wukari by Jukun youths led to several properties 
a violent conflict between the were destroyed 
Christians and Muslims 
2. An argument between a royal prince October 1 7 ,  7 people were 
and some Muslim youths over right 2005 killed while 
of way led to a violent conflict several properties 
between Jukun Christians and Hausa! were destroyed 
Jukun Muslims 
3 .  The demolition o f  a mosque built at July 1 3 , 20 1 0  1 0  people were 
the Area Command Headquarters of killed while 
the Nigeria Police by Jukun Christian several others 
Youths led to violent conflict between were injured and 
Christian Jukun and Hausa I Jukun several properties 
Muslims destroyed. Over 
2000 people were 
displaced. 
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4.  The accidental shooting of a J ukun February 23,  340 people were 
youth during an argument over the 20 1 3  killed, several 
use of a football field by two properties 
opposing teams triggers a violent destroyed while 
ethno-religious conflict several people 
were displaced. 
5 .  A misunderstanding between May 3, 20 1 3  Over 500 people 
Christians and Muslims during the were killed while 
burial procession of one of the Jukun several people 
Traditional Rulers led to a violent were injured. More 
conflict than 1 00 buildings 
were destroyed 
and over 3,000 
people displaced. 
6 .  Armed Fulani herdsmen attacked April 3, 20 1 4  The Village Head 








7 .  Armed Jukun Youths attacked Jibu April 7, 20 1 4  73 people were 
town for allegedly harboring and killed while 
accommodating Fulani herdsmen that several others 
attacked Ando Manu village were injured 
8 .  A reprisal attack by Fulani herdsmen April 14,  3 people were 
from Jibu town against Jukuns in 20 1 4  killed i n  Nwokyo 
Nwokyo village for attacking Fulani village and more 




9 .  The attack o n  Nwokyo village by April 1 5 ,  Over 273 people 
Fulani herdsmen led to a violent 20 1 4  were killed, 48 
ethno-religious crisis between Jukun houses burnt and 
Christians and Hausa/lukun Muslims several people 
injured. Also, over 
5000 people were 
displaced 
1 0. The April 1 5th crisis in Wukari April 1 9th, Over 1 20 people 
spilled over to Gindin-Dorowa town 20 1 4  were killed with 
several properties 
destroyed and a lot 
of people were 
displaced to 
Wukari town 
1 1 . Jukun youths attacked Chinkai village May 25th, 62 people were 
in reprisal attack against Hausa / 20 1 4  killed while over 
Jukun Muslims 40 buildings were 
burnt down and 
lots of people 
were displaced 
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1 2. Another violent ethno-religious June 1 5th, About 300 people 
conflict erupted between the Jukun 20 1 4  were killed, while 
Christians and JukunlHausa Muslims over 200 buildings 
as result of the burning of a phone were destroyed in 
booth owned by a Hausa Muslim by Wukari metropolis .  
a n  unknown assailant. 
1 3 .  The violence that erupted o n  the 1 5th June 1 5th, About 30 people 
of June in Wukari spilled over to 20 1 4  were killed, while 
Rafin Kada, a neighbouring Jukun a lot of buildings 
settlement. were also 
destroyed. 
1 4 .  Un-known gun men from Ibi and August 1 7th, About 1 3  were 
Bantaji towns, attacked Nwuban, a 20 1 4  reportedly killed 
Jukun Village, in Wukari Local and many 
Government Area. properties worth 
thousands of Naira 
were destroyed as 
well as many 
people displaced 
from their homes. 
1 5 .  Another violent ethno-religious September About people were 




many people were 
displaced from 
Wukari town. 
1 6 .  Suspected Fulani herdsmen attacked 1 4th About 20 people 
Tunari village in Wukari Local September, were killed 
Government 20 1 4  including several 
buildings 
destroyed. 
1 7 .  Unknown gunmen attacked Tsundi 19 October, 26 people were 






1 8 . Unknown assailants attacked and On 7 About 1 5  people 
killed a Jukun along Federal November, were killed. 
University road in Wukari .There was 20 1 4  
a reprisal attack b y  Jukun youth the 
next day. 
1 9 .  Another violent crisis happened in On 8 1 2  people lost 
Wukari as a result of the November November, their lives 
7th attack. 20 1 4  
20. A violent crisis erupted on at Gidin- 2 December, 44 people were 
Doruwa a settlement in Wukari Local 20 1 4  killed, while 
Government.Area. several houses 
were destroyed. 
Source: Researcher 's survey, 2014 
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A cursory look at the above time line of the violent ethno-religious con­
flicts in Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State reveals that the 
conflict is primarily rooted in the struggle for political and economic 
control of Wukari, which assumed ethnic and religious dimensions. The 
persistent nature of the conflict also indicates that it has become pro­
tracted, particularly from April 20 14  to date. Generally, the impact of the 
violent ethno-religious conflicts on inter-group relations in Wukari Local 
Government Area of Taraba State can be categorized as follows: 
o Humanitarian impact 
• Economic impact 
• Social impact 
• Political impact 
HUMANITARIAN IMPACT 
Violent ethno-religious conflict in Wukari community has claimed 
so many lives of the residents of the area, especially Christians and Mus­
lims, Jukun and Hausa! Fulani. For instance, The People 's Daily of Mon­
day June 1 6, 20 1 4, reported that about thirty-two people were killed in 
Wukari. The persistent ethno-religious conflicts in the area also led to the 
displacement of many residents of Wukari. The Guardian Newspaper of 
Monday, August 1 8 , 20 14  indicated that there were many displaced per­
sons from the incidences of ethno-religious conflicts while The Premium 
Newspaper also observed that over seven hundred (700) people were dis­
placed from Wukari. 
ECONOMIC IMPACT 
The persistent ethno-religious conflicts in the Wukari Local Gov­
ernment Area of Taraba State have also negatively impacted the econ­
omy of the area. The Tiv farmers whose farming resourcefulness is the 
mainstay of the economy of Wukari as well as the Igbo traders are now 
both moving out in large numbers from the area for fear of their lives .  
This situation has greatly affected commerce and the economy of area. 
SOCIAL IMPACT 
Social interactions have been dislocated by the persistent ethno-re­
ligious conflicts in the Wukari town and its environs .  There is social and 
psychological separation between the Jukun Christians and the Jukun/ 
Hausa Muslims, deepened by mutual hatred and suspicion. The violence 
has also created a divided settlement pattern separating 'Jukun Christian/ 
jukun traditionalist settlement' and 'JukunlHausa Muslim settlement. '  By 
this settlement pattern, neither side could risk crossing to the other side 
without being killed. 
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POLITICAL IMPACT 
Politics in the area has also been negatively impacted by the persis­
tent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari. The political machinery of the 
area is controlled by the Jukun Christians and the Jukun Traditionalists . 
The Jukun Muslims and Hausa Muslims feel excluded from the politics 
of the area. The Jukun Muslims in particular feel that it is wrong for the 
Jukun Christians and Jukun Traditionalists to exclude them from what is 
rightfully theirs and vent their anger and frustration by repudiating and 
vilifying the Jukun culture, which the Jukun Christians and Jukun Tradi­
tionalists perceive as an abomination which must be corrected by all the 
means possible. During election periods, votes are often cast along relig­
ious lines and the Jukun Christians, because of their shear numerical size 
and the support it enjoys from its allies, the Jukun Traditionalists, domi­
nates the political landscape of Wukari Local Government Area of 
Taraba State. 
SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS 
CONFLICTS ON INTER-GROUP RELATIONS IN WUKARI LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT OF TARABA STATE 
Ethno-religious conflict is a common feature of most multi-cultural 
and divided societies, as Rabushka and Shepsle ( 1 972) assert in their 
famous work, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Insta­
bility. According to Rabushka and Shepsle, "divided states remain peren­
nially unstable and many survive on the brink of collapse and 
disintegration." Divided states also lack the capacity to manage the di­
verse groups interests, as Jinadu (2007) rightly observes about the nature 
and character of the state : 
. . .  the state and its institutions are ethnicised and im­
mersed in clientelist ethnic and religious networks and in 
ethnic/religious based struggle to implant and entrench 
ethnic or religious 'gatekeepers ' in critical, key positions 
in the bureaucracy and educational institutions, and in 
other public sector institutions and even in the private 
sector, which in many African countries relies heavily 
on the public sector (Jinadu, 2007) .  
Notwithstanding the above position, a very fundamental truth that 
must be stressed at this juncture is the fact that most conflicts in divided 
societies have become protracted and irresolvable primarily because peo­
ple still largely believe that it is only the state that has the capacity, or the 
magic-wand, to resolve conflicts when it is in fact the state that is gener­
ating social conflicts within its domain through its actions and inactions.  
Rummel ( 1 994) argues that the "government of any state is the greatest 
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potential threat to any group inside its boundaries ." It is imperative there­
fore that citizens and communities should understand that they are the 
ones who need to manage their problems, hence they must establish 
mechanisms and strategies that will effectively address the problems 
confronting them. No community or society can exist in isolation of 
other communities because communities exist interdependently. In this 
regard, Touval ( 1 985) has rightly observed that the "pluralistic character 
of most African states has led to the development of mechanisms of ad­
justment enabling the accommodation of the interests and needs of di­
verse ethnic groups .  Most have developed norms and procedures 
enabling the maintenance of an ethnic (religious) balance within the po­
litical and administrative institutions ."  
The following suggestions are proffered towards permanently ad­
dressing the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in Wukari Local Govern­
ment Area of Taraba State: 
a). Establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee 
Peace, as a valuable gem cannot be decreed unto any society be­
cause it requires the collective resolve of all stakeholders in order to 
plant the seed of peace, nurture it, and harvest its fruits. Peace, therefore, 
requires true reconciliation among all the stakeholders in any society in 
order for it to be instituted and sustained. The persistent ethno-religious 
conflicts in Wukari community have negatively affected the political, ec­
onomic, social and cultural landscapes of Wukari, with debilitating nega­
tive implications on inter-group relations in the area. All of the 
stakeholders in Wukari, especially the Jukun Christians and Jukun Tradi­
tionalists , Jukun Muslims and the Hausa Muslims, should immediately 
agree to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Committee that will be sad­
dled with the responsibility of reconciling the parties involved in the 
conflict. 
Michael Ignatieff ( 1 996), remarks, "as the African proverb reminds 
us, ' truth is not always good to say' , but when it is shared, it is capable of 
healing the wounds." Therefore, the establishment of a Truth and Recon­
ciliation Committee (TRC) is important because it will create the plat­
form that will assist the warring parties in Wukari to make sense of the 
complex issues involved in the conflict as well as reconcile them. As 
Lerche (2000) argues, all sides have their own version of the truth of 
"what really happened."  The parties will be able to reconcile the issues 
that had hitherto been irreconcilable. Some of these issues are what Har­
old Saunders identifies as: "fear, suspicion, rejection, mistrust, (exclusion 
and marginalization), hatred and misperception which are often greater 
obstacles to peace than an inability to resolve technically definable 
problems". 
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b). Power Sharing Arrangement 
It is a fact that most and if not all ethno-religious conflicts are inex­
tricably linked to the competition for political and economic resources 
and the tool that is often used in such competition is identity politics 
which is usually done by invoking the dare-devil politics of indigene 
versus settler dichotomy. In this contest, an indigene is perceived to be 
somebody who is historically affiliated to the place or town or commu­
nity or locality being contested for and by the virtue of hislher affiliation 
to the place, he/she enjoys some certain rights and benefits that those 
who are considered as settlers in the area cannot enjoy. 
On the other hand, a settler is perceived as a person who does not 
have historical affiliation to a place or town or community or locality, 
due to this ,  he or she is excluded from enjoying certain rights and bene­
fits that those who considers themselves indigenous to the place enjoy. 
This kind of perception and definition is a total violation of the concept 
of citizenship which is supposed to guarantee every bona fide citizen the 
legal right to enjoy the basic rights and benefits available in any part of a 
sovereign state. This is the reason why Ibrahim (2000:69) argues that 
ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria are linked to citizenship within the 
context of identity, which is rooted in the politics of inclusion or exclu­
sion. These are tied to claims and counter-claims over identity as a basis 
for determining who is excluded or included from decision making as 
well as access to opportunities under the 'we' versus 'them' cliche 
(Kwaja, 2008: 83) .  At the core of ethnic agitations and conflicts are "dis­
tributive questions, which are the fundamental sources of ethnic tensions 
in Nigeria" (Nnoli 1978 and 1 994) .  
As pointed out by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly 
Conflicts ( 1 997 : 100) : 
In many multi-ethnic and multi-religious societies, the 
procedures of majoritarian democracy have proven ef­
fective for managing group relations and maintaining so­
cial cohesion. However, in societies with deep ethnic 
and religious divisions and little experience with demo­
cratic government and the rule of law, strict majoritarian 
democracy can be self-defeating. Where ethnic and re­
ligious identities are strong and national identity weak, 
the population may vote largely along ethnic or religious 
lines. Domination by one ethnic or religious group(s) 
can lead to a tyranny of the majority [emphasis added] 
( 1 00). 
Indeed, it is always very important for communities and societies 
experiencing conflict to avoid both the tyranny of the majority and the 
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revengeful terrorism of the minority, and to understand that they have to 
work together to resolve their differences so as to build a just and fair 
community or society in which the rights and interests of all can be guar­
anteed. This example can also be applied to the Wukari case. Both the 
Jukun Christians and the Jukun Traditionalists who are the majority in 
Wukari Local Government Area of Taraba State and the minority Jukun 
Muslims who are always in alliance with the Hausa Muslims in the area 
must come to the understanding that they need to work out an inclusive 
political arrangement that would give both sides, and even the other 
groups resident in the area, the sense of belonging in the political archi­
tecture of Wukari. This is especially because some researchers on con­
flict management have pointed out that the openness of political 
institutions decreases the chances of occurrences of violent conflict and 
protests (e.g . ,  Kriesi, Koopmans,  Duyven-dak and Giugni, 1 995).  This is 
important because inclusive political arrangements reduce the tendency 
of competing groups resorting to violent agitations. The adoption of this 
practice will therefore assist in the accommodation of diversity, which 
will allay the fears of both the ethnic and religious minorities in the area 
as well as guarantee the protection of the rights of all the residents of 
Wukari. In addition, it will assist in the transformation of the perception 
of ethnic and religious loyalties from being a threat to the social cohesion 
of Wukari to being utilized as an engine of socio-economic development. 
CONCLUSION 
Religion and ethnicity are two very important tools that the elites in 
Nigeria employ in constructing and mobilizing identity in competitive 
situations. Identity politics have resulted in violent and uncontrollable 
conflicts of different intensity and magnitudes .  The major task of this 
paper has been to examine the dynamics of the persistent ethno-religious 
conflicts in Wukari area of Taraba State, Nigeria and the possibility for 
its sustainable management. The paper therefore proposed some very ro­
bust strategies for tackling the persistent ethno-religious conflicts in 
Wukari community with a view to making all the residents of Wukari, 
regardless of their ethnic or religious divide, work out some kind of mo­
dus vivendi that would enable them to accommodate each other and 
peacefully coexist. This is with the understanding that no community can 
exist in isolation of other communities hence communities exist 
interdependently. 
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